Constitution Bench Updates

In this significant case, a five-judge Constitution Bench considered whether same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry under the Indian Constitution. Multiple petitions sought recognition of same-sex marriages under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The Court delivered a split verdict (3:2), with the majority declining to legalize same-sex marriages or civil unions. While unanimously affirming the dignity, equality, and constitutional protection for LGBTQ+ persons, the majority held that the right to marry is not a fundamental right and that creating civil unions would amount to judicial legislation. The minority (CJI Chandrachud and Justice Kaul) favored recognizing civil unions for queer couples. The Court unanimously struck down discriminatory provisions in adoption regulations and directed the government to ensure non-discrimination against queer persons in accessing services.

A PIL challenged Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, which prohibited women aged 10-50 from entering the Sabarimala temple, citing the deity's celibate nature. The Constitution Bench, by a 4:1 majority, struck down the rule as unconstitutional. The majority held that the exclusion of women violated Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 25. The practice discriminated against women based on a biological attribute (menstruation) and denied them equal access to a public place of worship. Justice Indu Malhotra dissented, holding courts should not interfere in religious practices. The judgment triggered significant protests and review petitions are pending before a larger bench.

Joseph Shine, an Indian businessman based in Italy, challenged Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code which criminalized adultery. Under this provision, only the man who had sexual intercourse with a married woman could be punished; the woman was exempt, and a husband could not prosecute his own wife. The Constitution Bench unanimously struck down Section 497 as unconstitutional. The Court held that the provision was based on the notion that a wife is the property of her husband and violated Articles 14, 15, and 21. It treated women as chattel and denied them agency over their sexual choices. This judgment decriminalized adultery while affirming it remains a ground for divorce. It advanced gender equality by recognizing women as equal partners in marriage, not subordinate to their husbands.

This case arose from the M. Nagaraj judgment's requirement that SC/ST communities must demonstrate 'backwardness' for availing reservation in promotions. The question was whether this requirement was constitutionally valid given that SCs/STs are already presumed backward. The Constitution Bench held that the State is not required to collect quantifiable data to demonstrate backwardness of SC/STs for the purpose of providing reservation in promotions. It modified M. Nagaraj to this extent while maintaining the requirements of inadequate representation and efficiency. The judgment recognized the distinct constitutional status of SCs/STs based on untouchability and historical discrimination, distinguishing them from OBCs who are identified based on social and educational backwardness. It also applied the creamy layer concept to SC/STs in promotions.

In this historic judgment, a five-judge Constitution Bench unanimously decriminalized consensual homosexual acts between adults by reading down Section 377 IPC. The Court overruled its 2013 decision in Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation. The petitioners, including dancer Navtej Singh Johar, argued that Section 377 violated their fundamental rights to equality, privacy, dignity, and freedom of expression. The Court held that criminalizing consensual same-sex relations was irrational, arbitrary, and manifestly unconstitutional. The judgment recognized sexual orientation as an essential attribute of privacy and dignity, holding that LGBTQ+ individuals are entitled to all constitutional rights. Chief Justice Misra stated that history owes an apology to LGBTQ+ members for the delay in providing redressal. Section 377 continues to apply to non-consensual acts, minors, and bestiality.

This landmark judgment by a five-judge Constitution Bench recognized the right to die with dignity as a fundamental right and legalized 'living wills' or Advance Medical Directives in India. Common Cause, an NGO, filed a PIL seeking recognition of the right to refuse life-prolonging medical treatment. The Court held that the right to live with dignity under Article 21 includes the right to die with dignity. It permitted terminally ill patients to execute Advance Medical Directives specifying their wish to refuse treatment in case of terminal illness or permanent vegetative state. The judgment laid down detailed guidelines for executing living wills, requiring attestation by a notary, approval by medical boards, and judicial oversight. These guidelines were simplified by the Supreme Court in 2023 to make the process more accessible.

In this momentous decision, a nine-judge Constitution Bench unanimously declared that the right to privacy is a fundamental right protected under the Constitution. The case arose from challenges to the Aadhaar biometric identification scheme. The Court held that privacy is intrinsic to the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and emanates from the freedoms guaranteed in Part III. The judgment overruled earlier decisions in M.P. Sharma (1954) and Kharak Singh (1963) that had denied constitutional protection to privacy. The Court recognized that privacy includes bodily integrity, personal autonomy, informational self-determination, and the freedom to make intimate decisions including those relating to sexual orientation. This landmark ruling laid the foundation for subsequent judgments on LGBTQ+ rights and data protection.

Shayara Bano challenged the practice of instant triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat), where a Muslim husband could divorce his wife by pronouncing 'talaq' three times in one sitting. She argued this practice violated fundamental rights guaranteed to Muslim women. The Constitution Bench, by a 3:2 majority, declared instant triple talaq unconstitutional and void. The majority held that the practice is not integral to Islam and is violative of Article 14. The minority held it was protected under Article 25 but struck it down as it violated Article 14. This historic judgment empowered Muslim women and led to Parliament enacting the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, criminalizing instant triple talaq.

This five-judge Constitution Bench decision arose from the political crisis in Arunachal Pradesh and addressed crucial questions about the Governor's powers and the anti-defection law. The Court held that a Governor cannot use Article 163 discretion to summon, prorogue or dissolve the Assembly when a notice for Speaker's removal is pending. The judgment clarified that when the Speaker's removal notice is pending, disqualification proceedings cannot continue, creating a constitutional deadlock that requires resolution through proper procedures. The Court restricted the Governor's discretionary powers and reinforced that the Governor must generally act on ministerial advice.

This five-judge Constitution Bench struck down the 99th Constitutional Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014, which sought to replace the Collegium system for judicial appointments with a commission involving executive participation. By a 4:1 majority, the Court held that the NJAC violated the independence of the judiciary, which is part of the Constitution's basic structure. The inclusion of the Law Minister and two eminent persons nominated by the executive in the judicial appointment process was held to undermine judicial primacy. Justice Chelameswar dissented, arguing that the Collegium system lacked transparency and accountability. The judgment preserved judicial primacy in appointments while acknowledging the need for reforms in the existing system.

This case arose when police refused to register an FIR despite a complaint about the kidnapping of minor Lalita Kumari. The matter was referred to a Constitution Bench to resolve conflicting judicial opinions on whether FIR registration is mandatory under Section 154 CrPC upon receipt of information about a cognizable offense. The Constitution Bench held that registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 CrPC if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offense, and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such situations. The Court clarified that preliminary inquiry may be conducted only when information does not clearly disclose a cognizable offense. This judgment resolved decades of controversy about police discretion in FIR registration, establishing clear guidelines that strengthen victims' access to justice while allowing limited scope for preliminary inquiry in specific categories like matrimonial disputes and commercial offenses.

This watershed judgment fundamentally transformed Indian arbitration jurisprudence by overruling the controversial Bhatia International decision. The five-judge Constitution Bench held that Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies only to arbitrations where the juridical seat is in India, effectively ending Indian courts' interference in foreign-seated arbitrations. The Court examined the territorial principle underlying the UNCITRAL Model Law and held that the 'seat' of arbitration determines the curial law that governs the arbitration. This meant that if parties chose a foreign seat, Indian courts would have no supervisory jurisdiction under Part I of the Act. The judgment brought Indian arbitration law in conformity with international standards. To avoid chaos and protect vested rights, the Court applied the judgment prospectively to arbitration agreements executed on or after September 6, 2012. This BALCO decision is considered the most significant arbitration judgment in India, making the country a more arbitration-friendly jurisdiction for international commerce.

This five-judge Constitution Bench upheld the 93rd Constitutional Amendment and the Central Educational Institutions Act 2006 providing 27% OBC reservation in higher education. The Court addressed the interplay between Articles 15(4), 15(5), and the basic structure doctrine. While upholding OBC reservations, the Court mandated exclusion of 'creamy layer' from OBC benefits based on the Indra Sawhney principle. The judgment balanced affirmative action with merit, holding that periodic review of backward class status is necessary. This case significantly impacted educational policy and the implementation of reservations in India.

This landmark judgment, also known as the Ninth Schedule Case, addressed whether laws placed in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution are completely immune from judicial review. The Supreme Court unanimously held that laws inserted into the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973 (the date of the Kesavananda Bharati judgment) are subject to judicial review if they violate the basic structure of the Constitution. The Court established that Parliament cannot escape judicial scrutiny by placing laws in the Ninth Schedule. This judgment closed a significant loophole that had allowed potentially unconstitutional laws to avoid judicial review by being placed in the Ninth Schedule, thus strengthening constitutional supremacy and judicial review.

This case arose from the 'cash for questions' scandal where MPs were caught on camera accepting bribes to raise questions in Parliament. The expelled MPs challenged their expulsion, raising fundamental questions about parliamentary privileges and judicial review. The five-judge Constitution Bench upheld Parliament's power to expel members for contempt or gross misconduct under Article 105(3), drawing from House of Commons privileges. However, the Court also established that parliamentary privileges are not absolute and are subject to judicial review in cases of gross illegality or violation of constitutional provisions. The judgment balanced Parliament's autonomy to regulate its affairs with constitutional limits and fundamental rights.

This five-judge Constitution Bench upheld the constitutional validity of the 77th, 81st, 82nd, and 85th Amendments providing for reservation in promotions for SCs/STs, consequential seniority, and carry-forward of unfilled vacancies. However, the Court imposed conditions requiring the State to demonstrate backwardness, inadequate representation, and maintenance of administrative efficiency before implementing reservation in promotions. The judgment balanced equality of opportunity with protective discrimination, holding that these conditions are enabling provisions requiring data-based justification. This case significantly shaped the law on reservation in promotions.

This Constitution Bench judgment addressed the contentious issue of regularization of temporary, daily-wage, and ad hoc employees in government service. The Supreme Court categorically held that regularization cannot be claimed as a matter of right, and public employment must strictly adhere to constitutional provisions ensuring equality of opportunity under Articles 14 and 16. The Court observed that backdoor entries into public service through the device of temporary appointments followed by regularization defeat the constitutional scheme of equality. It held that if an employee was appointed without following the due procedure of open competition, such employee cannot claim regularization merely on the basis of length of service. However, the Court provided a one-time relief for those irregularly appointed who had completed ten years of continuous service as on the date of the judgment, directing their absorption subject to availability of vacant posts. This judgment has fundamentally shaped the law on regularization and has been consistently followed in subsequent cases.

This case, arising from the dissolution of the Bihar Legislative Assembly in 2005, reaffirmed and extended the principles laid down in S.R. Bommai. The Supreme Court declared the dissolution unconstitutional, holding that the Governor's recommendation was based on speculative grounds without concrete evidence. Uniquely, this was the first case where an assembly was dissolved before its first meeting. The Court held that the President's power under Article 356 cannot be exercised to prevent parties from staking claims to form government, even if majority was allegedly obtained through illegal means. The judgment strengthened safeguards against arbitrary use of Article 356 and emphasized that allegations of horse-trading should be dealt with through proper legal mechanisms, not by dissolving assemblies.

This Constitution Bench judgment comprehensively interpreted the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, particularly addressing the crucial question of whether abolition of contract labour leads to automatic absorption of contract workers in the principal employer's establishment. The Court held that mere abolition of contract labour does not result in automatic absorption. The appropriate government's notification under Section 10 only prohibits employment of contract labour for specified work; it does not mandate absorption. The Court overruled the contrary view taken in Air India v. United Labour Union (1997). The judgment clarified that contract workers whose services are abolished have no automatic right to be absorbed by the principal employer. However, the Court directed that displaced workers should be given preference in fresh employment and provided procedural safeguards. This judgment significantly impacted the rights of contract labour across India.

This case examined the validity of Tamil Nadu's appointment of special public prosecutors with legal credentials outside the normal qualification requirements. The Supreme Court addressed the broader question of the relationship between constitutional provisions and statutory requirements for public appointments. The judgment clarified principles of constitutional propriety in appointments and emphasized that relaxation of qualifications must be based on reasonable grounds. The case contributed to jurisprudence on Article 14's application to public appointments and the limits of executive discretion.